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EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
JAMES R. HOOPER*
PAUL R. WILLIAMS*
The contemporaryworld is beset by conflicts and issues that seem to challenge the
utility ofsovereignty as conventionally understood.'

Stephen D. Krasner
INTRODUCTION

There are currently over fifty sovereignty-based conflicts throughout the
world, and nearly a third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists listed by the
United States Treasury Department are associated with sovereignty-based conflicts
and self-determination movements.2 To date, the "sovereignty first" international
response to these conflicts has been unable to stem the tide of violence, and in
many instances may have contributed to further outbreaks of violence. This article
will argue that the "sovereignty first" doctrine is slowly being supplemented by a
new conflict resolution approach which we dub "earned sovereignty."
This article is the first in a series of three articles prepared under the auspices
Managing Director, Public International Law and Policy Group, former Foreign Service Officer with
wide experience in the Middle East and Balkans, former Washington Director, International Crisis
Group, and former Executive Director, The Balkan Action Council. M.A. Columbia University, B.A.
American University School of International Service. This article was prepared with the assistance of
Nina Bang-Jenson, Stephanie Frease, Cassandra Cappobianca, Megan Akers, Karen Heymann, and
Marc Vogtman.
. Holds the Rebecca Grazier Professorship of Law and International Relations, American University.
Ph.D., Cambridge 1998; J.D., Stanford Law School 1990; B.A., UC Davis 1987. From 1991-1993
Professor Williams served as an Attorney-Advisor in the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Legal
Advisor for European Affairs. During the course of his legal practice, Professor Williams has assisted
nearly a dozen states and sub-state entities in international peace negotiations, and has served as a
delegation member in the Dayton, Rambouillet/Paris, Key West, Lake Ohrid/Skopje, and
Belgrade/Podgorica negotiations. He has also advised fifteen governments across Europe, Africa and
Asia on matters of public international law.
1. Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm, 30
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 651(1999).

2. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Cumulative List of Recent OFACActions 2002,
available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/2002cum.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2002).
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of the Public International Law & Policy Group that discuss the emerging
approach of earned sovereignty, and is the product of the melding of two
presentations delivered at the University of Denver by the co-authors. The purpose
of this article is to provide a detailed definition of earned sovereignty, and its subcomponents, as well as to track the development of the approach through recent
state practice. The second article sets forth the legal basis for the approach, and
the third article tracks international efforts to employ the approach as a basis for
structuring a long term resolution of the Kosovo conflict.
As noted in the introductory note to this series of articles, In light of recent
state practice, the emerging conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty may
be characterized as encompassing six elements - three core elements and three
optional elements.
The first core element is shared sovereignty. In each case of earned
sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international institutions
may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to or in lieu of the
parent state. In rare cases, the international community may exercise shared
sovereignty with an internationally recognized state.
The second core element is institution building. This element is utilized
during the period of shared sovereignty prior to the determination of final status.
Here the sub-state entity, frequently with the assistance of the international
community, undertakes to construct institutions for self-government and to build
institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions.
The third core element is the eventual determination of the final status of the
sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. In many instances the status will
be determined by a referendum, while in others it may involve a negotiated
settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often with international
mediation. Invariably the determination of final status for the sub-state entity
involves the consent of the international community in the form of international
recognition.
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty entails
the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority and
functions over a specified period of time prior to the determination of final status.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditionality may
be applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions by
the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the sub-state
entity's final status. In either case the sub-state entity is required to meet certain
benchmarks before it may acquire increased sovereignty. These benchmarks may
include conditions such as protecting human and minority rights, developing
democratic institutions, instituting the rule of law, and promoting regional stability.
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, involves continued
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as
continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the
right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states.
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It is important to note that the approach of earned sovereignty does not
perceive "sovereignty" to be a unitary right, but rather a bundle of authority and
functions which may at times be shared by the state and sub-state entities as well
as international institutions. 3 Sovereign functions may include control over foreign
relations, defense, policing, immigration, banking, currency, trade, development of
natural resources, taxation, transportation, education, social welfare and judicial
matters.
To further develop an understanding of the emerging approach of earned
sovereignty this article will review recent state practice in which the approach has
been employed to bring about or attempt to bring about a resolution of a
sovereignty-based conflict. The focus of the review will be on deducing common
themes and distilling key conditions for the utilization of the emerging approach.
Case studies include the Road Map for Peace for the Israeli/Palestinian conflict;
the Good Friday Accord for Northern Ireland; the Machakos Protocol for Sudan,
the Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara; UN Security Council Resolution
1244 for Kosovo; the Dayton Accords for Bosnia; UN Resolution 1272 for East
Timor; the Comprehensive Agreement for Bougainville; and the new constitution
for the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. These examples include proposed peace
agreements, successful peace agreements and unsuccessful peace agreements. As
the success of an agreement is based on both its substantive provisions as well as
numerous external factors, such as the political will of the parties, we have sought
to reference a wide variety of agreements, and not just those deemed to be
unqualified successes.
It is important to recall that the aim of this article is not to argue for the
creation of a new conflict resolution approach, but rather to explore some of the
ways in which earned sovereignty is already being practiced around the world.
This exploration is intended to provide greater clarity regarding the most useful
instruments and tools that practitioners have at their disposal to make constructive
use of earned sovereignty.
As such, this article seeks to contribute to a more informed debate about the
circumstances in which earned sovereignty may be applied constructively. To note
that earned sovereignty can be utilized in the context of particular international
disputes is not to assert that it is a panacea that can be applied to resolve all
international problems involving disputes over rival territorial claims, internal
rebellions or self-determination movements. Many conflict resolution practitioners
that have the responsibility to utilize conceptual tools in real-world situations
where lives are at stake and misjudgments can have severe consequences welcome
such a debate. Diplomats have recognized the need to provide a solution where the
involved parties will only stop the violence upon guarantees of independence. For
some time negotiators have employed the tools of earned sovereignty selectively in
crisis prevention and conflict resolution situations. Their attempts to use such
techniques, however, have been hindered to some extent by the unwillingness of

3. See Karen D. Heymann, EarnedSovereigntyfor Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to Avoiding
a NuclearHolocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming Fall 2003).
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state actors in the international system to acknowledge the utility of the concept
even as it was increasingly being applied.
While the origins of the approach of earned sovereignty are uncertain, it is
apparent that the crisis in the former Yugoslavia highlighted the need to develop a
new conflict resolution approach to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. In 1991
in the former Yugoslavia the international community was faced with the choice of
recognizing the Yugoslav sub-state entities of Croatia and Bosnia as independent
states, which was sure to lead to ethnic violence by the Serb-minority, or to
continue to affirm the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, which was sure to
encourage President Milosevic's efforts to ethnically cleanse large areas of those
two entities. In the end, the European Union and United States delayed for too
long the recognition of the successor states, and when they did eventual recognize
Croatia and Bosnia they did so without any capable preparation for the foreseeable
consequences. In hindsight, had the European Union and the United States
undertaken a process of earned sovereignty for Croatia and Bosnia whereby they
were slowly extricated from Yugoslavia in a manner which protected the
legitimate interests of the Serbian minority and created democratic institutions, the
ethnic conflicts might have been avoided.
Learning from these mistakes the European Union, United States and the
United Nations have increasingly sought to rely upon the approach of earned
sovereignty as it provides increased flexibility for determining the timing of
eventual independence and an opportunity to build functioning institutions and a
track record of protecting minority and human rights prior to international
recognition.
RECENT PRECEDENT FOR THE EMERGING APPROACH OF EARNED SOVEREIGNTY
While numerous peace agreements include the elements of earned
sovereignty, this article will focus on the recent surge in agreements which
embrace all three of the core elements and many of the optional elements. This
section provides a brief description of the agreements which will be relied upon in
the remainder of the article to illustrate the various elements of the approach of
earned sovereignty.
The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap was developed by the Quartet of the United
States, EU, UN and Russia and involves a three-phased plan for resolving the
middle east conflict through the achievement of a secure Israel, and an independent
and democratic Palestine.4 To accomplish this objective the Roadmap provides for
the creation of Palestinian institutions of self-government followed by the
international recognition of an independent Palestine with provisional borders,
with subsequent agreement upon final borders and issues such as refugees and the
status of Jerusalem. Progression through these phases is contingent on the
4. U.S. and PartnersPresent Proposalfor Mideast Peace, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2003, available
at www.nytimes.com (last visited May 1, 2003). Proposalfor 'Finaland Comprehensive Settlement' to
Middle East Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2003, available at www.nytimes.com (last visited May 1,
2003).
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Palestinian authority meeting a number of conditions relating to democratization
and the end to violence and terrorism. As a result of recent violence the
implementation of the Roadmap has been suspended.
The Machakos Protocol seeks to initiate a resolution of the Sudanese conflict
by providing for the cessation of hostilities between the Northern and Southern
forces and for the opportunity of the South to determine via referendum after six
years whether it wishes to remain part of Sudan. The Protocol also provides for
Veto power by the South over certain legislative and executive actions. The
Protocol is a precursor to a full agreement.
The UN sponsored Baker Peace Plan for the resolution of the Western Sahara
conflict provides for the UN assisted creation of a institutions of self-government
for the Western Sahara Authority and the devolution of numerous sovereign
authorities and functions to that government. The Plan also provides for a
referendum to determine the final status of Western Sahara within five years.
The Union Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro, mediated by the EU,
provides for the sharing and/or devolution of all sovereign authority and functions
between the two member states and for a referendum on dissolution of the Union
and secession after three years. The purpose of the three year period of shared
sovereignty is to permit the member states time to transform their economic and
democratic systems into viable individual entities and to harmonize their economic
and political systems with European standards.
UN Security Council Resolution 1244, with reference to the Rambouillet
Agreement, provides for the interim UN administration of Kosovo with security
provided by a NATO-led force.5 During this interim period the UN exercises near
absolute executive and legislative authority within Kosovo, as it seeks to build
institutions of self-government. As these institutions become functional the UN
devolves certain sovereign authorities and functions to the Kosovo government.
The full devolution of authority and the determination of final status will be based
on Kosovo's compliance with democratic and other standards, and subject to
internationally mediated negotiations with the republic of Serbia.
The Good Friday Accords, designed to bring about an end to the Northern
Ireland conflict provide for the creation of Northern Ireland institutions, and the
interim devolution of substantial power to those institutions so long as certain
conditions are fulfilled, including the decommissioning of weapons. The Accords
also provide that the people of Northern Ireland are entitled to a referendum on
unification with Ireland after seven years.
UN Security Council Resolution 1272 provided for the creation of the UN
Administration of East Timor after the conflict arising from East Timor's rejection
by referendum of Indonesia's proposal for autonomy within Indonesia.6 The
5. See Rambouillet Agreement: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,
ch. 2, art I, 2, available at www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvorarnbouillet-text.html (last visited
Oct. 8, 2002).
6. See UN Security Council Resolution 1272, and Agreement Between Indonesia and Portugal,
1999, available at
supra note 137; East Timor Popular Consultation ,May 5,
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Resolution provided authority for a two and a half year period of shared
sovereignty between the UN and East Timor during which time East Timor was
able to construct the institutions necessary for independent self-government. After
successfully meeting certain benchmarks East Timor was recognized as
independent and admitted to the United Nations.
The Comprehensive Agreement for Bougainville signed at Arawa in August
2001 provides that within a period of ten to fifteen years Bougainville may via
referendum undertake to secede from Papua New Guinea. During the interim
period Papua New Guinea and Bougainville will share certain sovereign authority
and functions, with Bougainville assuming increasing control over a wide range of
powers, functions, personnel and resources on the basis of guarantees contained in
the National Constitution and reflected in a new Bougainville constitution.
The Dayton Accords which brought an end to the Bosnian conflict provided
that many of the sovereign authorities and functions of the independent state of
Bosnia would be managed by an internationally appointed High Representative for
an indeterminate period. 7 The Accords also provided for the deployment of
international military forces to maintain internal security. While conditionality is
not explicit, the pattern of practice in Bosnia indicates that the international
civilian authority will be discontinued only upon such a time as Bosnia can
adequately function as an independent state.
THE FIRST CORE ELEMENT: SHARED SOVEREIGNTY

During an initial period of shared sovereignty, the state and sub-state entity
may both exercise sovereign authority and functions over a defined territory. In
some instances, international institutions may also exercise sovereign authority and
functions in addition to or in lieu of the parent state. In rare instances, the
international community may exercise shared sovereignty with an internationally
recognized state. In many instances some form of regional or international
institution is responsible for monitoring the parties exercise of their authority and
functions.
The ability to share sovereign authority and functions between states, substate entities and international organizations creates an opportunity to disperse the
often violent tension associated with sovereignty-based conflicts and to ease the
parties onto a path for the long-term resolution of the conflict. If handled
constructively, shared sovereignty affords a cooling off period during which
central authorities and aggrieved peoples can each continue to pledge fidelity to
their own mutually incompatible final aims while initially suspending violence.
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrameEng04.html (last visited
Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of East Timor
Ballot, May 5, 1999,
available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrameEng03.html
17th, 2002)
7. See generally General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995,35 I.L.M. 75 (1996)

Oct. 17th, 2002);
Through A Direct
(last visited Oct.
Herzegovina with
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Frequently shared sovereignty may provide the sub-state entity with sufficient
elements of self-government so that the interest in outright independence is
substantially lessened bringing about an end of the conflict through some perpetual
autonomy. It is reasonable to assume in the Bougainville case this is the hope of
the mediators and Papua New Guinea. In other cases, such as Montenegro and
Northern Ireland, the period of shared sovereignty is necessary for the state and
sub-state entity to establish a viable relationship that will survive the eventual
independence or territorial re-association of the sub-state entity. In still others,
such as Kosovo and East Timor, the period of shared sovereignty is used to
establish order from the chaos of an armed conflict and to create time while the
international community works to help the new entity to create operational
institutions of self-government.
In most instances shared sovereignty occurs between states and sub-state
entities seeking autonomy or independence. The two most comprehensive cases of
such shared sovereignty are the new constitution for the Union of Serbia and
Montenegro, and the Northern Ireland Good Friday Accords.
The Serbia and Montenegro Agreement creates an elaborate structure of
shared sovereignty between the two member states. Under the agreement the
member states may maintain international relations, conclude international
agreements and establish branch offices in other states, if it is not contrary to the
competencies of the Union. The Member states may also assume membership in
international and regional organizations that do not require international
subjectivity as the condition for their membership. The president of each member
state also sits on the Supreme Defense Council, which must act by consensus, thus
providing each member state with shared authority for the defense policy of the
Union.
The Supreme Court which is comprised of an equal number of judges from
each of the member states must include judges from the Constitutional Courts of
the member states whenever it is hearing a case relating to the conformity of the
legislation or competencies of the member states with the legislation or
competencies of the Union, or a case between the member states themselves.
While the Union government does exercise some exclusive authority and
functions, they are limited to matters such as immigration, selection of flag and
anthem, and working with the EU on economic harmonization. All diplomatic
representatives must be appointed with the consent of the member states. To
ensure the representation of the interests of the member states in the exercise of
even these limited functions, the constitution creates a complicated arrangement
whereby of the five cabinet positions two ministers shall be from the same member
state as the President, and three shall be from the other member state. Moreover,
the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defense may not be from the same
member state, and upon the completion of a two-year period (half their term),
certain Ministers must exchange their functions with their Deputies, who are from
different member states.
In practice the Union exercises almost no original authority and merely serves
as a conduit between the member states and the international community, in

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

particular the EU and the International Financial Institutions. Almost all sovereign
authority and functions are exercised by the member states and nearly all financial
resources are controlled by the member states.
In Northern Ireland, after more than a century of tension and violence, on
April 8, 1998, the Irish and British governments and eight participating parties
reached a political settlement regarding the status of Northern Ireland. The
Agreement provides that upon a referendum of the people of Northern Ireland the
province may secede from the United Kingdom and join with Ireland. In the
interim the agreement provides for the devolution of certain sovereign authorities
and functions to Northern Ireland while retrenching some of the jurisdictional
power of the United Kingdom, and the claimed jurisdiction of Ireland.
Specifically, it calls for the British government to repeal the 1920 Government of
Ireland Act which reasserted British jurisdiction over all of Ireland and requires the
Irish government relinquish its constitutional claim to the Northern province.
As a result, the citizens of Northern Ireland are enjoying unprecedented levels
of self-governance and democratic control. The Northern Ireland Assembly, which
is the first local legislative body in the territory's history to have substantial,
elected, cross-community representation, exercises significant legislative and
executive authority. The Assembly is entrusted with the responsibility of electing
Ministers with department responsibilities (e.g., education and health) to carry out
executive functions, except as to those such as security, justice, prisons and
policing that remain with the central government in the interim.
Similarly, the Bougainville Agreement provides that during the interim period
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville will share certain sovereign authority and
functions, with Bougainville assuming increasing control over a wide range of
powers, functions, personnel and resources on the basis of guarantees contained in
the National Constitution and reflected in a new Bougainville constitution. Also,
in the case of the UN sponsored Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara,
numerous powers are to be devolved to the Western Sahara Authority relating to
taxation, economic development, internal security, law enforcement commerce,
resource development, and social welfare. While Morocco retains the authority for
the foreign relations of Western Sahara, such power is to be exercised in
consultations with the Western Sahara Authority and representatives of the
Authority may be included on Moroccan delegations.
While Serbia/Montenegro, Northern Ireland, Bougainville and the Western
Sahara share sovereignty with a central authority, in a number of instances states
and sub-state entities share sovereign authority and functions with international
organizations during an interim period prior to a determination of final status.
Frequently the international community exercises certain sovereign authority and
functions because the state has been precluded from exercising those functions and
the sub-state entity is not yet capable of doing so. As will be discussed in the next
section, the international community frequently uses this period of shared
sovereignty to assist the sub-state entity in establishing the necessary institutions
for self-government.
The East Timorese came under UN supervision after they rejected via
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referendum a proposal which would have provided for autonomy within Indonesia.
In light of the violent response by Indonesian military forces and paramilitary
groups in East Timor Indonesia was forces to recognize the right of East Timor to
independence, and the UN replaced Indonesia as the authority responsible for the
management of sovereignty during the transition to full independence for East
Timor. During the period of shared sovereignty, UN officials headed the
ministries of Internal Security, Justice, Political Affairs, Constitutional and
Electoral Affairs, and Finance, while East Timorese headed the ministries of
Internal Administration, Infrastructure, Economic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and
Social Affairs. The National Consultative Council was chaired by the UN
Transitional Administrator and comprised of three UN officials and over a dozen
East Timorese appointed by the UN Administrator officials.
In the case of Kosovo, UN Resolution 1244 provided for the creation of the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which initially assumed
responsibility for nearly all Kosovo's sovereign authority and functions, leaving
only a few to be exercised by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Over time the
UNMIK representative worked to create a Kosovo Constitutional Framework
providing for a parliament and presidency. The UN representative then embarked
on a process of devolving specified powers to the Kosovo institutions and
excluding the exercise of any authority by FRY institutions. Moreover, internal
and external security for Kosovo is provided by a NATO-led force, and elections
are conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).
The element of shared sovereignty is quite flexible with the number and
nature of devolved functions varying greatly, as well as the time frame of shared
sovereignty, which may range from three years as in Montenegro up to fifteen as in
Bougainville. In some instances, it may be indefinite and subject to the fulfillment
of certain conditions as opposed to specified timelines. Shared sovereignty also
lends itself to the establishment of markers and milestones which the emerging
entity must meet in order to move beyond the transition phase to final status - an
optional element called conditional sovereignty, which will be discussed below.
THE SECOND CORE ELEMENT: INSTITUTION BUILDING

To create the capacity for the assumption of sovereign authority and functions
necessary for the establishment of an autonomous entity, or a future independent
state, it is essential during the period of shared sovereignty to construct institutions
for self-government. In most instances these institutions are constructed with the
assistance of the international community.
In the case of East Timor the United Nations was authorized by the Security
Council to construct all the necessary institutions to transition East Timor from a
period of shared sovereignty with the UN to one of independence. East Timor was
in need of substantial assistance as in response to the referendum rejecting
continued association with Indonesia, its military forces in cooperation with militia
groups invaded with incredible brutality, killing hundreds, deporting hundreds of
thousands to West Timor, and decimating 80 percent of East Timor's
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infrastructure.
To implement the transition to self-governance, the Secretary General
appointed a Transitional Administrator for East Timor who also served as the
Special Representative to the Secretary General for East Timor. Although the
Transitional Administrator retained ultimate authority over the territory, he quickly
moved to establish the National Consultative Council (NCC) comprised of 15
individuals as a way to bring the East Timorese into the decision-making process
early on. The same regulation that created the NCC, also created Joint Sectoral
Committees to be composed of East Timorese and international experts to provide
advice in the areas of agriculture, education, environment, health, human rights,
infrastructure, local administration, natural resources, finance and macroeconomics.
Then, in July 2000, the Administrator created eight cabinet-level positions
comprised of four internationals and four East Timorese. Also in July, at the
urging of East Timorese members of the NCC, the Administrator transformed that
body into a larger, all-Timorese National Council composed of 33 members to
serve as the nucleus of a future assembly. These two bodies provided the skeletal
framework for East Timor's first nascent government, the East Timor Transitional
Administration.
The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap provides that the Quarter will assist the
Palestinians in constructing a number of institutions necessary for assuming greater
attributes of sovereignty. In particular the Roadmap provides for the restructuring
of security services, the establishment of an Interior Ministry, the appointment of
an interim prime minister or cabinet with executive decision-making capacity, the
adoption of a Palestinian constitution, and the creation of an election commission.
In the case of the UN sponsored Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara, the
UN is to assist with the creation of a Western Sahara government, including a
Chief Executive, Legislative Assembly and a Supreme Court. Elections for the
Assembly and the Chief Executive are to be held by the UN within one year of the
adoption of the Baker plan.
In the case of Northern Ireland, while there was no need to provide for the
creation of administrative institutions, there was a need to create political
institutions and to reform many of the key administrative institutions. The
agreement thus provided for the creation of a Northern Ireland Assembly which
would be able to absorb the sovereign functions and authority to be devolved from
the United Kingdom. The agreement also provided for the creation of two
consultative mechanisms to facilitate political stability during the period of shared
sovereignty and the transfer of sovereign functions and authority to Northern
Ireland-a North/South Ministerial Council and a British-Irish Council.
The Northern Ireland Assembly is a 108-member Assembly with executive
and legislative powers. In order to prevent gridlock or dominance by the two
major voting blocs (those favoring union with England and those favoring union
with Ireland), the accord requires that "key decisions" taken by the Assembly
receive cross-community support by a "weighted majority" or "parallel consent."
The North/South Ministerial Council is made up of those with executive
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authority in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The Council was required by
the agreement to identify at least twelve areas for future cooperation throughout
the island, including six areas where new implementation bodies will carry out
joint responsibilities immediately. (In late 1998, the Council identified the latter as
inland waterways, food safety, trade and business development, certain EU
programs, language, and aquaculture and marine matters. The six other areas of
cooperation will include transport, agriculture, education, health, environment, and
tourism).
The British-Irish Council was created to deal with bilateral issues of mutual
interest, with a particular focus on sensitive matters of policing, security, justice
and prisons. The Accord provides that those issues remain with the Secretary of
State, but indicates they could one day be transferred to the Northern Ireland
Assembly. The Council includes representatives from the British government, the
Irish government, the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and
Wales, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
In some instances the sub-state entity may begin to create institutions of selfgovernment prior to the period of agreed shared sovereignty. For instance, in the
case of Montenegro the Montenegrin government with support of the United States
and European Union both prior to and after the signing of the Union Treaty
established a Foreign Ministry with unofficial diplomatic offices abroad, a
Ministry of Finance, and a Central Bank. The Montenegrin government also
adopted the Deutsch Mark, and subsequently the Euro in an effort to promote
integration with European monetary institutions. Throughout this time Serbia
continued to use the Yugoslav dinar.
THE THIRD CORE ELEMENT: DETERMINING FINAL STATUS

At some point during the process of earned recognition it will be necessary to
determine the final status of the sub-state entity. The options for final status range
from substantial autonomy to full independence. In some instances, such as East
Timor the final status is determined during the initial stages of the process,
whereas in others it occurs after a period of shared sovereignty and institution
building. While the nature of final status is frequently determined by a
referendum, it may also be determined through a negotiated settlement between the
state and sub-state entity, often with international mediation. Invariably the
determination of final status for the sub-state entity involves the consent of the
international community in the form of international recognition.
In the case of East Timor the rejection by referendum of the proposal for
autonomy within Indonesia began the process of earned sovereignty. In most
instances, however, the date for a referendum is set to occur after a period of
shared sovereignty and institution building. For instance, the agreement between
Montenegro and Serbia for the creation of a Union of Serbia and Montenegro
provides that after three years either republic may separate from the Union and
become independent via a referendum. The UN's Baker Peace Plan for resolution
of the Western Sahara conflict provides that the final status of Western Sahara
shall be determined by referendum no earlier than four and no later than five years
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after the adoption of the peace plan. The Machakos protocol between Sudan and
Southern Sudan provides for an internationally monitored referendum after six
years by which the people of South Sudan may either confirm the unity of the
Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace
Agreement or vote for secession. The Bougainville Agreement provides for a
referendum on the separation of Bougainville from Papua New Guinea after ten
and before ten to fifteen years from the adoption of the agreement. In the case of
the Bougainville agreement the results of the referendum must, however, be
ratified by the parliament.
The Northern Ireland Agreement takes a more flexible approach. The
agreement explicitly acknowledges that a majority of the population in Northern
Ireland currently wish to remain part of the United Kingdom and that any change
in that status can only come about by majority vote. The agreement requires the
British Secretary of State to call for a referendum on independence every seven
years if it is "likely" that the majority of those voting would express a wish that
Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a
united Ireland. If the resulting vote favors uniting with Ireland, the Secretary of
State is obligated to take such proposals as are necessary to the British Parliament
to give effect to the referendum's result.
In some instances the final status is to be determined by a negotiated
settlement, which may or may not involve a non-binding referendum. In the
Rambouillet Accords the final status of Kosovo was to be determined by an
international conference which would take into consideration the will of the people
for independence. The current efforts to determine the final status of Kosovo focus
on a negotiated settlement between Kosovo and Serbia with substantial
international mediation.
The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap provides that the final status of Palestine will
be determined in a two stages. The first stage will follow successful institution
building and will involve an international conference convened by the Quartet at
which the parties will negotiate the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state with provisional borders. The second stage will involve a second conference
at which the parties will conclude a permanent status agreement encompassing
agreement on permanent borders, refugees, settlements and the status of Jerusalem.
THE FIRST OPTIONAL ELEMENT: PHASED SOVEREIGNTY
In order to enhance the relationship between shared sovereignty and institution
building some earned sovereignty agreements have incorporated the element of
phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty involves the measured devolution of
sovereign functions and authority from the parent state or international community
to the sub-state entity during the period of shared sovereignty. The timing and
extent of the devolution of authority and functions may be correlated with the
development of institutional capacity and/or conditioned on the fulfillment of
certain conditions such as democratic reform and the protection of human rights.
Kosovo presents the most comprehensive example of the use of phased
sovereignty to manage the devolution of sovereign authority and functions.
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Subsequent to resolution 1244, the UN endorsed a Provisional Constitutional
Framework for Kosovo which provided that UNMIK and Kosovo entities would
exercise most of the functions typically associated with an independent state,
including foreign relations. Initially nearly all the authority and functions were
designated "reserved competencies" which remained with UNMIK. Since the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution UNMIK has gradually transferred nearly
all the local powers to Kosovo municipal authorities, and has begun a slow but
stead process of transferring powers to Kosovo's central government institutions.
While the power to regulate transportation has been completely transferred, only
minimal powers relating to the conduct of foreign affairs have been transferred.
The degree of transfer is determined by an informal mix of institutional
capacity on the part of Kosovo, the degree to which Kosovo is perceived by
UNMIK to reasonably exercise the powers which it currently possesses, and the
coordination of the timing of devolution with progress being made towards
resolving the final status of Kosovo. With respect to the latter factor, UNMIK is
concerned that it not transfer all powers to Kosovo too soon as it might prejudice
the outcome of the final status talks as a complete assumption of these powers
would render Kosovo a de facto independent entity.
Other agreements which include an element of phased sovereignty are the
Northern Ireland Accords, the Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap, and the Bougainville
Agreement. In the Northern Ireland Agreement the United Kingdom is able to
manage the rate of devolution, and even to reverse the devolution by suspending
parliament if the IRA fails to comply with its obligations to demobilize and
decommission its weapons. The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap provides for the
phased accumulation of sovereign attributes beginning with the adoption of a new
constitution and elections for a prime minister and cabinet and ending with the
possible creation of an independent Palestinian state. The Bougainville Agreement
also provides for the Bougainville Government to assume increasing control over a
wide range of powers, functions, personnel and resources during the interim period
prior to the determination of final status.
Importantly not all instances of earned sovereignty require the element of
phased sovereignty. For instance, upon ratification of the agreement for the
creation of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro both member states immediately
assumed the sovereign authority and functions allocated to them under the
agreement. In fact, Montenegro had exercised many of those functions prior to the
adoption of the agreement.
THE SECOND OPTIONAL ELEMENT: CONDITIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

The approach of earned sovereignty may provide the option of conditioning
the transfer of sovereign authority and functions to the sub-state entity, or the
determination of final status, on its fulfillment of certain benchmarks. These
benchmarks may include conditions such as protecting human and minority rights,
developing democratic institutions, instituting the rule of law, and promoting
regional stability.
The element of conditional sovereignty has its origins in the European

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 31:3

approach of earned recognition of the successor states of the former Soviet Union
and former Yugoslavia. In response to calls for international recognition by the
republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, on December 16, 1991, the
European Community Council of Foreign Ministers developed a policy of earned
recognition. 8 Under this approach, states seeking recognition by the European
Community were required to meet a set of detailed criteria. The European
Community then adopted additional criteria to be applied specifically to the
republics of Yugoslavia, and required that the republics seeking recognition must
submit an application to the Yugoslav Peace Conference at that time being
conducted by the UN and EU. The co-chairs of the Peace Conference would then
seek a determination from the Arbitration Commission as to whether the applicant
states fulfilled the criteria for recognition.
According to the Declarationon Guidelines on the Recognition of New States
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the specific criteria which each applicant
state was required to meet included:
1) Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the
commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris,
especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;
2) Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;
3) Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by
peaceful means and by common agreement;
4) Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; and
5) Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by
recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional
disputes.
The European Community further proclaimed that it would not recognize
entities which were the result of aggression, and they would take account of the
effects of recognition on neighboring states.
The European Community then issued a second, more specific, Declaration
on Yugoslavia,9 which added the conditions that the applicant republic 1) accept
the provisions laid down in the European Community Draft Convention on Human
Rights, especially those in Chapter 11 on the rights of national or ethnic groups,
and 2) that the republics continued to support the efforts of the U.N. and the
continuation of the Peace Conference.' 0 While the European Community generally
8. Council of Ministers of the European Community, Declaration on Guidelines on the
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, (December 16, 1991).
9. European Community Declaration on Yugoslavia (December 16, 1991).
10. The Declarationon Yugoslavia provided that republics seeking recognition must apply to the
Chairmen of the Peace Conference by December 23, 1991, and the Chairmen, would pass the
applications to the Arbitration Commission for a ruling as to whether the applicants met the criteria set
forth in the Guidelinesand Declaration. The Arbitration Commission would make its recommendation
to the European Community's Council of Foreign Ministers, who would then announce its decisions on
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recognized the determinations of the Arbitration Commission, it did not
exclusively follow those recommendations. Thus, upon the recommendation of the"
Arbitration Panel it recognized Slovenia and Croatia, but did not recognize
Macedonia despite the Commission's determination that it fully met the
conditions. Similarly, upon the recommendation of the Commission it required
Bosnia to hold a referendum to determine the will of the people for independence,
and rejected the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's claim to continue the
international legal personality of the former Yugoslavia.
The case of Kosovo provides the most detailed example of conditional
sovereignty. In 2002 the UN Security Council adopted a proposal by UNMIK
identified as"standards before status." In brief, the UN had determined that before
Kosovo could undertake final status negotiations to secure independence it must
meet a number of standards or benchmarks. According to UNMIK, the general
prerequisites of the standards before status approach were, "full compliance with
and implementation of Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework. Multiethnicity, tolerance, security, and fairness under normal conditions, without special
measures."" In particular, UNMIK placed significant emphasis on the creation of
a multi-ethnic society.
Specifically, the benchmarks covered the areas of
functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee
returns and reintegration, economic reform and development, property rights,
dialogue with Belgrade, and the responsible operation of the Kosovo Protection
Corps.
For each of these categories, UNMIK set forth goals, benchmarks, and
specific actions to be taken by the local community. For instance, with respect to
freedom of movement, JNMIK set the goal that all communities can circulate
freely throughout Kosovo, including city centers, and use their language. The
benchmark for measuring the attainment of this goal was the unrestricted
movement by minorities without reliance on military or police. The required local
action included policy and sustained action by local institutions to promote
freedom of movement publicly and unprompted condemnation by holders of public
office of obstruction and violence.
Other agreements contain similar conditionality.
For instance the
Bougainville agreement provides that the referendum on final status will only be
recognition by January 15, 1992. In order to carry out its task of rendering determinations on the
independence of the republics of Yugoslavia, the Commission created a questionnaire which was sent
on December 24, 1991, to those republics invited to apply for recognition. Conference on Yugoslavia
Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M.
1488 (1992). (Introductory Note by Maurizio Ragazzi). This questionnaire was only sent to the
republics of Yugoslavia, as the republics of Soviet Union were not required to formally apply to the
European Community for recognition, and thus were not required to subject their requests to the review
of the Arbitration Commission.
11. UN Mission in Kosovo, Standards Before Status, May 2002 available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/benchmarkseng.pdf. Press Release, United Nations,
Highlights Of The Introductory Remarks At A Press Conference By Michael Steiner, Special
Representative Of The Secretary-General In Kosovo, June 27, 2002 available at
http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/pc020627.htm [hereinafter Highlights].
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held if the Bougainville government ensures the decommissioning and disposal of
weapons and undertakes good governance, including the development of
democracy, transparency, and accountability, as well as respect for human rights
and the rule of law, including the Constitution of Papua New Guinea. The IsraeliPalestine Roadmap conditions the movement from phase two (the transition phase)
to phase three (the final status phase) on the completion of free and open elections
in Palestine, the appointment of new cabinet officials, the creation of a new
constitution, reform of the Palestinian security forces, and the designation of
provisional borders. Recently, President Bush has also emphasized that progress
in rooting out corruption would be explicitly linked to progress toward the
establishment of a provisional Palestinian state. In the case of Northern Ireland,
the continued devolution of authority was conditioned on the decommissioning of
paramilitary forces and the surrender of weapons.
With East Timor, the conditions were less substantive and more related to the
creation of institutions. For instance, in order for East Timor to be entitled to
formally declare independence it was first required by the UN Security Council to
1) undertake a nation-wide consultation process and make decisions regarding
electoral procedures and composition of the future Constituent Assembly; 2) elect
members of the Constituent Assembly and draft the constitution; and 3) establish
the government and hold Presidential elections if required by the Constitution.
Importantly, not all agreements contain the element of conditionality. For
instance the Baker plan for Western Sahara and the Machakos Protocol for Sudan
set a specific date for the devolution of sovereign authority and functions as well as
the determination of final status without conditions.
THE THIRD OPTIONAL ELEMENT: CONSTRAINED SOVEREIGNTY

Constrained sovereignty involves continued limitations on the sovereign
authority and functions of the new state, such as continued international
administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the right of the state to
undertake territorial association with other states.
In certain cases, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina a fully independent state may be
forced to share sovereign authority and functions with an international
organization. The 1995 Dayton Peace agreement, which ended the Bosnian
conflict with Serbia, in effect established a regime whereby the independent state
of Bosnia was put within a de facto trustee relationship with its sovereign authority
and functions shared with an international High Representative from a west
European country. Security is provided by a NATO-led Force. The international
civilian presence now numbers close to eight thousand. In fact, the Office of the
High Representative has served as a defacto central governing authority in Bosnia
since late 1995, with the power to veto and promulgate legislation and remove
officials at any level of government from municipal to provincial to state. A
United Nations office oversees police and refugee matters, and for the first several
years after the agreement was signed, elections were handled by the OSCE.
East Timor also is under a soft form of constrained sovereignty as the
international community, in the form of a UN follow-up mission UNMISET
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(United Nations Mission of Support for East Timor), which provides continued
assistance in the areas of: 1) civilian administration; 2) law and order (police and
development of a law enforcement agency); and 3) military security (maintaining
internal and external security).' 2 The administrative elements were scheduled to
continue through the beginning of 2004, while continued military assistance and
training would continue until the second battalion of the new East Timor Defense
Force became operational (at least through 2003). Although independent, East
Timor will continue to rely heavily on the UN and donor countries as it continues
to progress toward ever-increasing levels of sovereignty.
NOTE ON MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EARNED SOVEREIGNTY

Frequently during the process of earned sovereignty a monitoring mechanism
is established to build confidence among the parties, to ensure coordinated
implementation of the Agreement, to monitor compliance, and to assist in the
resolution of any disputes. In the case of Bougainville the parties created an intergovernmental supervisory body charged with overseeing the implementation of the
agreement and establishing the new Autonomous Bougainville Government. The
same body was also granted competency to resolve disputes between the new
Bougainville government and Papua New Guinea. The Machakos Protocol for
Sudan provides for the creation of an Assessment and Evaluation Commission to
monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and conduct a mid-term
evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the Peace Agreement. The
Commission is to be comprised of representatives of the parties as well as
representatives from neighboring states and from the observer states of Italy,
Norway, the UK and US. The Baker plan for Western Sahara provides for UN
monitoring and for the right of the Secretary-General to issue binding
interpretations regarding any disputes which arise with respect to the
implementation of the plan.
In the case of Northern Ireland, the parties have created a series of trilateral
mechanisms involving the new Northern Ireland government, the Irish government
and the British government which include the North/South Ministerial Council and
the British-Irish Intergovernmental Council. The Agreement also provides for the
creation of a specialized Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, the
membership of which must reflect community balance. The Commission is
designed to advise as to the adequacy and enforcement of human rights
protections, to propose recommendations, to consider draft legislation, to bring
court proceedings and otherwise to ensure that the human rights commitments
under the Agreement are met.
In many instances the parties decide that objectives of a monitoring
mechanism are best met when the monitors are international. In these instances,
the monitoring mechanism might be the United Nations, a regional body such as
12. See Press Release: Security Council Establishes Support Mission in East Timor Unanimously
Adopting Resolution 1410, U.N. SCOR, 4534th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/7400 (2002), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7400.doc.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
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the Organization of American States or the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, an ad hoc group of nations, or combinations of the above.
In some instances, such as Papua New Guinea domestic monitoring mechanisms
may be combined with international mechanisms. In that instance, the domestic
mechanisms are augmented by an international Truce Monitoring Group and the
presence of a UN Political Office for Bougainville.
The Dayton Accords provided for extensive participation of international
organizations in the implementation of the Bosnia peace settlement. In the military
arena, the NATO-led security forces assisted in implementing the terms of the
agreements regarding territory, size and disposition of forces, and in the
establishment of a durable peace. The agreement tasked the OSCE with carrying
out an election program for Bosnia. The Dayton Accords also required the parties
to grant access to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations Development
Program, all of which thereby have acknowledged roles in the implementation of
the settlement. Finally, an International Police Task Force, under the auspices of
the United Nations, was established to train and monitor law enforcement
personnel and their activities. Similarly, in Kosovo and East Timor substantial
numbers of international civilian administrators were deployed to manage the
sharing of sovereign authority and functions, and the Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap
provided for extensive monitoring operations by members of the Quartet.
CONCLUSION

Political leaders, diplomats and representatives of states and sub-state entities
must deal with the tensions and confusions created by the friction between
traditional notions of sovereignty and the increasing reliance on earned
sovereignty. The latter has attained vitality and momentum as a result of its
practical utility to those involved in peacemaking and conflict resolution. At
times, however, diplomats and leaders find it difficult to combat the notion that
earned sovereignty will undermine the world order by creating new levels of
statehood. While this may to some extent be inevitable during periods of
transition-such as the sovereignty transition existing in today's global
community-much greater emphasis must be accorded to practical and theoretical
efforts to identify additional circumstances where earned sovereignty can be
applied constructively. Similarly, efforts should be made to draw attention to
situations where it is unlikely to be of benefit. The variety of examples furnished
in this presentation should contribute to that aim.

